Sarah Lawrence College

DigitalCommons@SarahLawrence
Articles and Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

2015

The Science of Sensation: Dostoevsky, Wilkie Collins and the
Detective Novel
Melissa Frazier
Sarah Lawrence College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.slc.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Russian Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Frazier, М. "The Science of Sensation: Dostoevsky, Wilkie Collins and the Detective Novel." Dostoevsky
studies : journal of the International Dostoevsky Society, vol. 19, 2015, pp. 7-28.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works at
DigitalCommons@SarahLawrence. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Other Publications by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@SarahLawrence. For more information, please contact
alester@sarahlawrence.edu.

D OSTOEVSKY
S TUDIES 19

The Journal
of the International
Dostoevsky Society
Managing Editor · Horst-Jürgen Gerigk

New Series
Volume 19
2
0
1
5

Editorial Board
Managing Editors:

Bibliography Editor:

Horst-Jürgen Gerigk – Universität Heidelberg
Deborah A. Martinsen – Columbia University
Rudolf Neuhäuser – Universität Klagenfurt
Ulrich Schmid – Universität St. Gallen

June Pachuta Farris – The Joseph Regenstein
Library, The University of Chicago, 1100
East 57th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637,
U.S.A.

Editorial Consultants:

Honorary Editors:

Stefano Aloe – Università di Verona
Carol Apollonio – Duke University (President of
the North American Dostoevsky Society)
Ellen Chances – Princeton University
Evgenia V. Cherkasova – Suffolk University,
Boston, Mass.
Nel Grillaert – Université de Ghent
Katalin Kroó – Budapest ELTE
Michael R. Katz – Middlebury College
Robin Feuer Miller – Brandeis University
Sophie Ollivier – Université Michel de Montaigne
Bordeaux III
Susan Mc Reynolds Oddo – Northwestern University
Valentina Vetlovskaia – Russian Academy of
Sciences (Pushkin House, St. Petersburg)
Sarah Young – University College London

Michel Cadot – Université de Paris-Sorbonne
Erik Egeberg – Universitetet i Tromsø
Gene Fritzgerald – The University of Utah
Robert Louis Jackson – Yale University
Malcolm V. Jones – The University of
Nottingham

Gedruckt mit freundlicher Unterstützung der “Wintershall Holding GmbH, Kassel”.
Dostoevsky Studies/New Series is published annually by Narr Francke Attempto Verlag
Subscription price per year: € 58,– (plus postage). Orders can be placed through your bookseller,
or directly at Narr Francke Attempto Verlag, P.O. Box 2567, D-72015 Tübingen, Germany
Fax + 49 / 7071 / 97 97 11, info@narr.de
Peer-Review: Unsolicited contributions are welcome. Please send three copies for evaluation
to one of the Managing Editors or to the publisher: info@narr.de.
Computer typeset: Georg Reimer, Heidelberg
Cover design: Heike Haloschan, Tübingen
© 2016 · Narr Francke Attempto Verlag, Dischingerweg 5, D-72070 Tübingen, Germany
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written
permission from the publisher.
Printed in Germany on acid-free paper.
ISSN 1013 2309
ISBN 978-3-89308-977-2

International Dostoevsky Society
Founded 1971
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
President:

Vladimir Zakharov (Russia)

Honorary Presidents:

Horst-Jürgen Gerigk (Germany)
Malcolm Jones (United Kingdom)
Deborah Martinsen (USA)
Rudolf Neuhäuser (Austria)
Ulrich Schmid (Switzerland)

Vice-Presidents:

Stefano Aloe (Italy)
Toyofusa Kinoshita (Japan)
Katalin Kroó (Hungary)
Robin Feuer Miller (USA)
Tetsuo Mochizuki (Japan)
Sophie Ollivier (France)
Igor Volgin (Russia)

Executive Secretary:

Jordi Morillas (Spain)

Treasurer:

Séamas O’Driscoll (USA)

HONORARY BOARD
Michel Cadot (former President, France)
Robert Louis Jackson (former President, USA)
Malcolm Jones (former President, United Kingdom)
Rudolf Neuhäuser (former President, Austria)
Mihai Novicov (former Vice-President, Romania)
Aleksander Skaza (former Vice-President, Slovenia)
REGIONAL COORDINATORS
Australia:
Brazil:
Czech Republic:
Estonia:
France:
Germany:
Hungary:
Italy:
Japan:

Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover
Fatima Bianchi
Milusa Bubenikova
Sergei Dotsenko
Sophie Ollivier
Maike Schult
Katalin Kroó
Rosanna Casari
Tetsuo Mochizuki

New Zealand:
Poland:
Russia:
Scandinavia:
Spain:
Switzerland:
United Kingdom:
USA:

Irene Zohrab
Andrzej de Lazari
Karen Stepanyan
Erik Egeberg
Jordi Morillas
Ulrich Schmid
Sarah Young
William Mills Todd III

DOSTOEVSKY STUDIES
The Journal of the International Dostoevsky Society
New Series
Volume XIX, 2015
___________________________________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS ◊ INHALT
ARTICLES ◊ AUFSÄTZE

MELISSA FRAZIER
The Science of Sensation:
Dostoevsky, Wilkie Collins and the Detective Novel .......................... 7
EMMA LIEBER
Smerdyakov and Parricide ..................................................................29
RICHARD J. ROSENTHAL
Why Dostoevsky Quit Gambling ....................................................... 33
ULRICH SCHMID
Dostoevsky and Regicide:
The Hidden Topographical Meaning of Crime and Punishment ....... 51
KATALIN KROÓ
Печоринский Ставрогин – Перевоплощение лермонтовской
поэтики в романе Достоевского «Бесы»
(По поводу письма Ставрогина к Даше)................................................ 63

2

Table of Contents ◊ Inhalt

LITERATURE SURVEY ◊ FORSCHUNGSBERICHT
HORST-JÜRGEN GERIGK
Dostojewskij-Forschung im deutschen Sprachraum
zwischen 1971 und 2011 ........................................................................... 89

BIBLIOGRAPHY ◊ BIBLIOGRAPHIE
JUNE PACHUTA FARRIS
Current Bibliography 2015 ............................................................... 135
Reference ......................................................................................136
Serial Publications and Special Journal Issues Dedicated to
Dostoevsky ...................................................................................138
Dissertations, Theses .................................................................... 138
Articles, Books, Essays, Festschriften, Manuscripts .................... 141

BOOK REVIEWS ◊ REZENSIONEN
Р. Ю. Данилевский. Фридрих Шиллер и Россия. СПб.: Издательство
«Пушкинский Дом», 2013.-656 с. (Сер.: Библиотека Пушкинского
Дома).
(Aleksandra Toičkina) ............................................................................. 217
Ф. М. Достоевский. Полное собрание сочинений и писем в тридцати
пяти томах. 2-е издание, исправленное и дополненное. СанктПетербург, «Наука».2013-2014.Т.1-3.
(Aleksandra Toičkina) ............................................................................. 219
Н. Ф. Буданова. «И свет во тьме светит…» (К характеристике
мировоззрения и творчества позднего Достоевского). СПб.: ИД
«Петрополис», 2012.-408 с.
(Aleksandra Toičkina) ............................................................................. 221
В. А. Туниманов. Лабиринт сцеплений. Избранные статьи / Отв.ред.
С. Н. Гуськов; составители Н. Л. Сухачев, С. Н. Гуськов; вступительная статья Н. Л. Сухачева и М. В. Отрадина. – СПб.: Издательство
«Пушкинский Дом», 2013. - 592 с.

Table of Contents ◊ Inhalt

3

(Aleksandra Toičkina) .............................................................................224
В. Н. Захаров. Имя автора – Достоевский. Очерк творчества. - М.:
«Индрик», 2013.-456 с.
(Aleksandra Toičkina) .............................................................................226
Handbuch Komparatistik. Theorien, Arbeitsfelder, Wissenspraxis. Herausgegeben von Rüdiger Zymner und Achim Hölter. Stuttgart: J. N. Metzler’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung und Carl Ernst Poeschel Verlag 2013. 405
Seiten.
(Horst-Jürgen Gerigk)............................................................................. 229
Dostoevskij. Materialy i issledovanija. Tom 20. Sankt-Peterburg: NestorIstorija 2013. Otvetstvennye redaktory: K. A. Baršt, N. F. Budanova. 656
Seiten.
(Horst-Jürgen Gerigk)............................................................................. 231
Eckhard Henscheid: Dostojewskis Gelächter. Die Entdeckung eines
Grosshumoristen. München, Zürich: Piper 2014. 283 Seiten.
(Horst-Jürgen Gerigk)............................................................................. 233
Alexander Burry: Multi-Mediated Dostoevsky. Transposing Novels into
Opera, Film, and Drama. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Press 2011 (= Studies in Russian Literature and Theory). 247 pp.
(Horst-Jürgen Gerigk)............................................................................. 235
Felix Philipp Ingold: Zwischen Tiefsinn und Nonsense. Dostojewskij als
Dichter des Absurden. In: Volltext. Zeitung für Literatur, Nr. 4 / 2014.
Redaktion: Porzellangasse 11 / 69, A-1090 Wien: S. 1 und S. 35-38.
(Horst-Jürgen Gerigk)............................................................................. 237
Greta Slobin: Russians Abroad. Literary and Cultural Politics of Diaspora
(1919-1939). Boston: Academic Studies Press 2013. 256 pp.
(Ulrich Schmid) .......................................................................................238
OBITUARIES ◊ NACHRUFE
REINHARD LAUTH
(Horst-Jürgen Gerigk) .......................................................................243

4

Table of Contents ◊ Inhalt

MIROSLAV JOHN HANAK
(Horst-Jürgen Gerigk) .......................................................................245
NEWS OF THE PROFESSION ◊ MITTEILUNGEN
HORST-JÜRGEN GERIGK
Ein Dostojewskij-Denkmal 2014 in Bad Homburg..........................249

Dostoevsky Studies, New Series, Vol. XIX (2015) pp. 7-28

MELISSA FRAZIER
Sarah Lawrence College

The Science of Sensation:
Dostoevsky, Wilkie Collins and the Detective Novel

Wilkie Collins’s most important publisher in Russia, like Dostoevsky’s,
was M. N. Katkov.1 Over the course of 1866, for example, Katkov’s The
Russian Herald (Русский вестник) serialized Collins’s Armadale alongside Crime and Punishment; in 1868, when Dostoevsky’s Idiot was being
serialized in the main part of the journal, it was with The Moonstone
appearing in the supplement or “приложение.” This proximity in time and
space calls attention to a deep literary affinity. The intense engagement
with his readership that Collins displayed on any number of levels, from
his dramatic plot twists to his use of multiple narrators, finds a clear parallel
in the lures Dostoevsky cast for his own readers, for example, while the
issue of women’s rights is in different ways of central concern to both.2
Still more striking is Dostoevsky’s and Collins’s shared response to the
limits imposed by what we might call Positivist science.
Both Dostoevsky and Collins reject a strict, simplistic materialism, as
both associate flawed aspirations to “extraordinariness” with an interest in
science, in Ivan Karamazov’s education as a natural scientist in The
Brothers Karamazov (1880), for example, as in Count Fosco’s study of
chemistry in The Woman in White (1859). On this level, Ivan’s break-down
and confession and Fosco’s death represent a defeat for science as well. At
the same time, both writers’ commitment to a less cut-and-dried yet
profoundly scientific world view is evident not just in figures like Ezra
1
While Katkov was Collins’ most prestigious publisher in Russia, he was not the only
one; Collins’s first and most prolific publisher in Russia was E. N. Akhmatova in her
perhaps second-tier journal, Collected Foreign Novels, Novellas and Stories in Russian
Translation (Собрание иностранных романов, повестей и рассказов в переводе на
русский язык, 1856-1885).
2
Collins’ consistent interest in women’s rights is perhaps immediately obvious; for
Dostoevsky, see Straus.
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Jennings in The Moonstone or Ivan’s devil, but in the very genre that both
practice: the novel of sensation.
D.A. Miller defines the novel of sensation as “one of the first instances
of modern literature to address itself primarily to the sympathetic nervous
system” (Miller 146), and while it is Collins’s critics who invented the
term, Dostoevsky, too, was frequently accused of bypassing his readers’
rational faculties in order to elicit a purely physical response. In other
writers this appeal to the sympathetic nervous system might suggest a
rigidly materialistic determinism. Dostoevsky and Collins, however, seem
drawn instead to the insights an emerging science of physiology offers into
fully scientific ir- or extra-rationality, as well as into questions of mind and
body and the material underpinnings of subjective perceptions. To recognize Dostoevsky’s engagement together with Collins in this more
flexible kind of science is to contribute to what Anna Kaladiouk (Schur)
calls “a more refined reading of Dostoevsky’s view of contemporary
science,” one that would also “restore to the science of Dostoevsky’s times
some of its intellectual range and complexity” (Kaladiouk 419-20).3
Especially the latter move has implications for our reading of a genre that
emerged alongside sensation: the detective novel.
It is striking that despite all the detecting that Dostoevsky and even
more Collins offer, literary historians tend to position both just a little off
to the side of a genre that in its twentieth- and twenty-first century
incarnations accommodates a remarkably wide variety of writers. The
peculiar limitation that both Dostoevsky and Collins face, I would argue,
arises from our association of their century with only one kind of science.
Literary historians most often connect the rise of the detective novel with
the late nineteenth-century rise of a forensic science that would offer an
empirical solution to all mysteries once and for all. As Vanessa L. Ryan
writes:
The association of the detective with superior powers of observation, vast
scientific and human knowledge, and, above all, the use of scientific
method, has made systematic thinking seem indispensable to the detective’s
art. In the world of Sherlock Holmes – the master of deductive logic and
forensic analysis – the figure of the detective tends to correspond to our
ideal of the pure scientist (Ryan 29).

3

For the on-going re-evaluation of nineteenth-century science in the Western European
context, see the seminal works by Beer and Tresch.
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“Deductive logic and forensic analysis” play little part in the science that
Dostoevsky and Collins advocate, perhaps because, as Lawrence Rothfield
argues, Sherlock Holmes marks a real shift in both our literature and our
science of detecting.4 As Rothfield acknowledges, however, to read Conan
Doyle’s stories in these terms alone is also to conflate Holmes’ own claims
with his author’s effects, to the point of ignoring the very real somatic
pleasures that Conan Doyle offers. Dostoevsky’s and Collins’s recourse to
sensation reminds us of the more ambiguous and indeterminate science
equally essential to detecting, as the detective novel, even in the admittedly
idealized world of Sherlock Holmes, was never a simple matter of “scientific method” and “systematic thinking” alone. It was instead always also,
in Umberto Eco’s words, of “all model plots ... the most metaphysical and
philosophical” (Eco 53).
Collins and Sensation
Collins is best-known for his invention in The Woman in White (1859) of
the genre that readers quickly came to know as the “novel of sensation.” In
their use of the term, critics then as now emphasized the “sensational” plot
turns that, as Richard Fantina puts it, relied “on the themes of inheritance,
bigamy, poisoning, drug abuse, and adultery, and ... frequent employment
of the deus ex machina and other startlingly improbable coincidences...”
(Fantina 23). The tag also reflects the phenomenal success enjoyed by The
Woman in White in particular, not just in Great Britain but across Europe.
In Russia, as A. V. Druzhinin wrote, “The Woman in White was one of the
most widely read novels in all of 1861,” “purchased and gulped down with
more greed than Dickens’ Expectations or Framley Parsonage” (Druzhinin
408).5 The term nonetheless originally referred to the physiological
response that Collins apparently intended to elicit.
To Collins’s critics, The Woman in White represented a literature
addressed to the body alone. As Ryan explains, “mid-nineteenth-century
advances in physiological psychology led both scientists and nonscientists
to consider whether ... there is a type of thought, a kind of ‘thinking without
thinking,’ that can serve as an epistemological alternative to reasoned and
4

Rothfield claims that Sherlock Holmes represents the moment when “the pathologically embodied person of realism” gives way to “the individuated body” (Rothfield 134)
as object of knowledge.
5
Translations from the Russian are mine unless otherwise noted.
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logical thought” (Ryan 15). Nancy Armstrong adds that a prime example
of this argument can be found in George Henry Lewes’s The Physiology of
Common Life (1859-60), the second volume of which is largely devoted to
“sensation,” or feeling vs. thinking, nervous system vs. mind (Armstrong
142). As Nicholas Daly writes, critics of the day understood the novel of
sensation not just to emerge from this conversation but to capitalize on its
insights to “conjure up a corporeal rather than a cerebral response in the
reader” (Daly 40).
In her 1862 review of Collins’s novel, for example, Mrs. Oliphant
marvels at the effect produced when the “Woman in White” reaches out to
touch Walter’s shoulder: “Few readers will be able to resist the mysterious
thrill of this sudden touch. The sensation is distinct and indisputable. The
silent woman lays her hand upon our shoulder as well as upon that of Mr
Walter Hartright.” Noting that the effect is then repeated when Walter
makes the connection between his chance companion and Laura, Mrs.
Oliphant concludes: “These two startling points of this story do not take
their power from character, or from passion, or any intellectual or
emotional influence. The effect is pure sensation, neither more nor less…”
(Wilkie Collins 119). Only a year later, the Rev. Henry Mansel argues,
sensation had become the marker of all current British writing:
A great philosopher has enumerated in a list of sensations ‘the feelings from
heat, electricity, galvanism, &c.,’ together with ‘titillation, sneezing,
horripilation, shuddering, the feeling of setting the teeth on edge, &c.’; and
our novels might be classified in like manner, according to the kind of
sensation they are calculated to produce. There are novels of the warmingpan, and others of the galvanic-battery type – some which gently stimulate
a particular feeling, and others which carry the whole nervous system by
steam. There are some which tickle the vanity of the reader, and some which
aspire to set his hair on end or his teeth on edge; while others, with or
without the intention of the writer, are strongly provocative of that sensation
in the palate and throat which is a premonitory symptom of nausea (Mansel
487).

Like Mansel, most reviewers were highly uncomfortable with the idea that
what the sensation novel produced was a kind of “thrill,” what The
Christian Remembrancer in 1864 described as a “drop from the empire of
reason and self-control ... which is a consistent appeal to the animal part of
our nature” (Wilkie Collins 212). In the terms that Louise McReynolds lays
out in her fine study of the changes wrought by the Great Reforms, Murder
Most Russian: True Crime and Punishment in Late Imperial Russia (2013),
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a psychology that gives “the dominant role” to “physiological explanations” (McReynolds 57) marked the Russian tradition in particular. While
Collins was perhaps not the most British of British writers – certainly The
Woman in White, like Crime and Punishment, owed a great deal to French
true crime stories and also to Balzac – it may also be that the anxious
reading offered by Mansel et al. slightly misrepresents his intentions.6
What sensation more accurately offered Collins was not the elevation of
body over mind, but their mutual implication.
In their haste to reassert the “empire of reason and self-control,”
Collins’s critics evidently saw his science of sensation in terms borrowed
from his most famous villain, Count Fosco in The Woman in White. As
Fosco explains:
The best years of my life have been passed in the ardent study of medical
and chemical science. Chemistry, especially, has always had irresistible
attractions for me, from the enormous, the illimitable power which the
knowledge of it confers. Chemists, I assert it emphatically, might sway, if
they pleased, the destinies of humanity. Let me explain this before I go
further.
Mind, they say, rules the world. But what rules the mind? The body.
The body (follow me closely here) lies at the mercy of the most omnipotent
of all mortal potentates – the Chemist... (Collins, Woman 560).

Particularly when he dips into what he calls “the more subtle resources
which medical and magnetic science have placed at the disposal of
mankind” (Collins, Woman 308), Fosco succeeds in instilling in others a
kind of “thinking without thinking,” and he radiates both “power and
intensity,” not just in his own words or his oft-noted resemblance to
Napoleon, but also in his extraordinary influence on both the people and
animals around him. Still, the novel suggests that Collins himself didn’t
share Fosco’s entirely mechanistic view.
Fosco, after all, is not the hero but the second and more significant
villain in a highly involved plot. The first villain, Sir Percival Glyde,
marries Laura Fairlie solely for her money and, when that money is not
immediately forthcoming, hatches a diabolical plot with his friend Fosco.
This plot hinges on Lady Glyde’s uncanny resemblance to the “Woman in
White,” one Anne Catherick, a weak-minded young woman whom Sir
6
Where Dostoevsky began his literary career with as translation of Eugénie Grandet in
1843, Collins introduced readers of Dickens’ Household Words to Balzac in 1859; as
for the French genre of true crime stories, Dostoevsky drew on Lacenaire (1836) for
Crime and Punishment, and Collins on Maurice Méjan’s Recueil des causes célèbres
(1807-14) (Murch 103).
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Percival has already institutionalized once. Now at Fosco’s urging, Sir
Percival purports to send Anne back to the asylum, but sends his wife in
her place. Meanwhile, as Fosco knows, Anne is already suffering from a
heart complaint, and when she dies under the guise of Lady Glyde, Sir
Percival inherits Laura’s fortune. Luckily for Laura, however, she is loved
by her erstwhile drawing master, Walter Hartright, who conspires with
Laura’s valiant half-sister Marian Halcombe to support Laura after her
escape from the insane asylum, drive Sir Percival to his death, and force
Count Fosco to France where he meets his end as a one-time member of an
Italian revolutionary organization turned spy.
The plot’s complications speak to Fosco’s imposing power, and Fosco’s
science, particularly in its “magnetic,” or mesmeric, aspects, is undoubtedly
his greatest tool. Fosco ultimately fails, though, largely because his science
assumes a strict separation between subject and object when, particularly
in the case of the redoubtable Marian, those borders prove more than a little
porous. While Marian herself acknowledges Fosco’s increasing control
over both her mind and her body, it is Fosco’s practice of mesmerism that
unleashes Marian’s own clairvoyant powers in her prophetic dream of
Walter’s return. It is then also Marian who ultimately achieves mastery
over Fosco when what he calls “the one weak place in [his] heart” leads to
the discovery of “the one weak place in [his] scheme” (Collins, Woman
569).7 The circumstances of Fosco’s failure suggest Collins’s investment
in a very different kind of science, one where subjects and objects might
mutually shape and reflect one another. This commitment is most clear,
however, when we juxtapose the collapse of Fosco’s schemes in The
Woman in White with Ezra Jennings’ triumph in The Moonstone.
Like The Woman in White, The Moonstone offers not just a famously
convoluted plot, but also a famously convoluted narration, as the mystery
of Rachel Verinder’s stolen diamond is told in thirteen parts by eleven
different narrators, each of whom relates only as much of the plot as s/he
witnessed first-hand. Only by novel’s end does it become clear that the theft
was perpetrated by Rachel’s two suitors acting as an impromptu tag-team.
One suitor, Godfrey Ablewhite, turns out to have been interested only in
Rachel’s fortune, as his subsequent attempts to raise money on her diamond
reveal. The other, Franklin Blake, not only loves Rachel, but also removes
the diamond from her room under the influence of a dose of opium that he
doesn’t know he has taken.
7
In my highly condensed argument here I draw on Winters, Taylor, and Pearl but come
to slightly different conclusions; I am grateful to my student Jacqueline Guo for
connecting Winters’ discussion of mesmerism’s power dynamics with Marian’s dream.
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This highly involved mystery is solved in a “bold experiment” planned
and executed by the marginalized figure of Ezra Jennings. Laboring under
the burden of his own unfairly but irredeemably sullied reputation,
Jennings’ scientific work “’addressed to the members of my profession – a
book on the intricate and delicate subject of the brain and the nervous
system’” (Collins, Moonstone 382) will never see the light of day.
Jennings’ origins and appearance, not to mention his addiction to opium,
also associate him with the Indian diamond and with an Indian mysticism
apparently at odds with good English science. Indeed, when Jennings first
proposes awakening Blake’s latent memory, the lawyer Mr. Bruff sees
nothing but “a piece of trickery, akin to the trickery of mesmerism,
clairvoyance, and the like” (Collins, Moonstone 410). Jennings insists,
however, that what he offers is real nineteenth-century British science:
“‘Science sanctions my proposal, fanciful as it may seem’” (Collins,
Moonstone 398), he tells Blake, before handing him extracts from the
works of two real figures in British medicine, Dr. William Benjamin
Carpenter and Dr. John Elliotson.8
In his preface to the novel, Collins appropriates Jennings’ claim by
emphasizing the empirical underpinnings of “the physiological experiment
which occupies a prominent place in the closing scenes of The Moonstone”
(Collins, Moonstone xxiii). It’s not just empirical underpinnings at stake
here, however. What the experiment shows is that while Blake objectively
stole the diamond, subjectively he didn’t; his responsibility for the theft is
exactly like Ivan Karamazov’s responsibility for the death of his father,
only in reverse – where Blake committed the crime and yet didn’t, Ivan
didn’t commit the crime and yet did. This blurring of the edges of
subjective and objective added to the element of “fancy” associated with
Jennings introduces into Collins’s science a kind of ir- or extra-rationality
that casts a different light on his efforts to elicit from his readers a “drop
from the empire of reason and self-control.” Where his critics saw only a
Fosco-like “consistent appeal to the animal part of our nature,” Collins
evidently sought a more complicated science still grounded in the material
reality of bodies in the world. For Dostoevsky the appeal of sensation was
exactly the same, a refinement that was lost on his contemporary critics as
it was on Collins’s.
8

Both well-known, but nonetheless very different. As Jenny Bourne Taylor notes, “[i]n
conflating Carpenter and Elliotson in this way Collins is condensing two figures whose
names ... would have had very different resonances in the 1860s: Carpenter, the
respected voice of mainstream physiological psychology; Elliotson, the marginalized
advocate of mesmerism” (Taylor 183).
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Sensation in Dostoevsky
Collins’s critics often compared the visceral reaction that his work elicited
to an illness that attacked the system. Mansel’s “nausea,” for example, is
a minor symptom compared to Geraldine Jewsbury’s 1854 description of
Collins’s “strength” in his earliest works as “the strength of fever” (Wilkie
Collins 55); by 1866 the Westminster Review described “the Sensational
Mania in Literature” as a “virus … spreading in all directions” (Wilkie
Collins 158). While the contemporary critical response to Dostoevsky is
not as organized, Dostoevsky’s readers likewise tended to describe his
writing as “morbid” or “sickly” (“болезненно”).9 This sickliness is often
associated with Dostoevsky himself, not just in terms of his well-known
epilepsy, but also as based on a reading of his works. Dostoevsky’s
characters are often also seen as sick, a point that Dostoevsky makes
himself. The effect of Dostoevsky’s writing on his readers is also an issue,
perhaps most strikingly in P. I. Tkachev’s 1873 review of Dostoevsky’s
Demons, “Sick People” (“Больные люди”).
For Tkachev, the “sick people” of his title are first Dostoevsky and then
his characters, all of whom he sees as suffering from a sort of schizophrenia. His real concern, however, is for the reader, who apparently suffers in
Russia as in Great Britain from the new literature of sensation. Dostoevsky’s writing, Tkachev argues, reflects an impoverished literary environment so desperate for “nervous irritation (нервного раздражения): scandals, horrors, piquancy” that it makes recourse to “police agents, examining
magistrates, and even just district court stenographers” (Tkachev 75-6).
Tkachev summarizes what he sees as Dostoevsky’s method: “Give us more
and more gossip, scandal, irritate all the more strongly the reader’s spinal
cord (спинной мозг), make his hair stand on end, entertain him, amuse or
frighten him, but just don’t make him think or look up from the page”
(Tkachev 75). Again he identifies a literature addressed “primarily to the
sympathetic nervous system,” a point N. K. Mikhailovskii makes more
generally in his influential article “A Cruel Talent” (“Жестокий талант,”
1882).
Written just after Dostoevsky’s death in 1881, “A Cruel Talent” is a
first attempt to summarize Dostoevsky’s oeuvre. While Mikhailovskii
grants Dostoevsky’s formal ability, he also sees a deliberate and sustained
attempt to inflict suffering on the reader through the use of “excessive and
9

For example: “The mind of Mr. Dostoevsky has sickly (“болезненные”) characteristics”; or: “Many of his thoughts and positions are so strange as could appear only in a
sickly-inclined (болезненно-настроенном) imagination,” see Volgin 31-32.

The Science of Sensation

15

entirely inartistic longeurs, introductory scenes … [and]… digressions”
(Mikhailovskii 332).10 This “cruel talent,” he continues:
will cloud your mind with its images and pictures and make your heart beat
faster, and only in those lucida intervalae when in the course of reading
sobriety returns to us, will you ask yourself: Why is he so tormenting that
Sidorov or Petrov? Why is he is titillating (щекочет) me, too, in such
tormenting fashion?

In fact, Mikhailovskii explains, there is no purpose to this suffering other
than to create “sensations (ощущений) that become a need” (Mikhailovskii
333), as in his estimation Dostoevsky’s writing served Russian society of
his day as nothing more than a kind of “narcotic” (“наркотического
свойства,” Mikhailovskii 334). The vocabulary is again striking, and if
Tkachev and Mikhailovskii as “progressive” critics had other axes to grind
with the politically conservative Dostoevsky, still their reading of the
formal devices at his command suggests that Dostoevsky, like Collins,
deliberately drew on the tools of sensation.11
This allegation might surprise readers who more readily associate
Dostoevsky with an opposition to the science of his day and especially to
the new science of physiology. According to Marmeladov, for example, a
copy of The Physiology of Common Life forms a large part of Lebezyatnikov’s reading program for Sonya in Crime and Punishment. Given that
Lebezyatnikov is a particularly hapless Nihilist, there can only be an
element of mockery here, and Claude Bernard receives similar treatment in
Dmitri Karamazov’s famous reference to the “trembling” of “little tails.”
When Alyosha visits Dmitri in prison, he is surprised at Dmitri’s sudden
question, “‘Who is this Carl Bernard?’” “‘No, not Carl, wait,’” he then
adds, “‘I’ve got it wrong: Claude Bernard. What is it? Chemistry or
something?’”(15:28; 588).12
Claude Bernard is the famous real French physiologist whose Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (Introduction à l'étude de la
médecine expérimentale, 1865) defined the basic principles of the scientific
10
On the “cunning devices” that Mikhailovskii descried in Dostoevsky’s work, see also
Kanevskaya 204.
11
Note that the “scientific” reading of Dostoevsky’s work is not always in terms of
“sensation” nor is it always negative; Dostoevsky’s early critic and friend Valerian
Maikov, for example, admiringly described his approach as “chemical,” see Frank 207.
12
All citations from Dostoevsky come from F.M. Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie
sochinenii, 30 vols. For non-Russian readers, page numbers from the translations of
Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky are provided. The format is as follows (PSS
Vol:page; P&V page).
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method. In Michael Katz’s summary, Bernard “believed in the absolute
determinism of natural science; in his words: ‘the conditions of a phenomenon once known and fulfilled, the phenomenon must occur’” (Katz 22),
and Rakitin seems to have explained as much to Dmitri. According to
Dmitri, Rakitin plans to write an article “with a tendency: ‘It was
impossible for him not to kill, he was a victim of his environment’” (15:28;
588). Dmitri adds:
Imagine: it’s all there in the nerves, in the head, there are these nerves in the
brain (devil take them!) … there are little sorts of tails, these nerves have
little tails […] and when they tremble, an image appears […] and that’s why
I contemplate, and then think … because of the little tails, and not at all
because I have a soul or am some sort of image and likeness … (15:28;
589).

As Robert Belknap notes, Rakitin’s teachings, at least in Dmitri’s
rendering, sound a good deal sillier than anything written by the real Claude
Bernard (Belknap 146-7). Still, Dmitri is right to see something Fosco-like
here. While Dmitri is apparently convinced by Rakitin’s science, his
explanation finishes with the anguished cry, “’And yet, I’m sorry for God!
.... Chemistry, brother, chemistry! Move over a little, Your Reverence,
chemistry’s coming!’” (15:28; 589).
Tkachev and Mikhailovskii’s reading would suggest, however, that
Dmitri’s anxious response is not Dostoevsky’s own, as would the narrator’s
use of the very term “sensation” (“ощущение”) in Crime and Punishment.
When Raskolnikov realizes that the police want to question him not about
the murder but about his debt, he is at first filled with “complete,
spontaneous, purely animal joy” (6:78; 98). This unthinking emotion
quickly gives way, however, to something much more troubling:
A dark sensation of tormenting, infinite solitude and estrangement suddenly
rose to consciousness in his soul…. What was taking place in him was
totally unfamiliar, new, sudden, never before experienced. Not that he
understood it, but he sensed clearly, with all the power of sensation, that is
as no longer possible for him to address these people in the police station,
not only with heartfelt effusions, as he had just done, but in any way at all…
Never until that minute had he experienced such a strange and terrible
sensation. And most tormenting of all was that it was more a sensation than
an awareness, an idea; a spontaneous sensation, the most tormenting of any
he had yet experienced in his life (6:81-2; 103-4).
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As Raskolnikov walks the streets of St. Petersburg, this “new, insurmountable sensation” becomes “a certain boundless, almost physical loathing for everything he met or saw around him” (6:87; 110) – a physical
reaction, the response of his body to the deed his rational mind has led him
to perform. This physiological response culminates at the novel’s end
when a different “certain sensation” seizes “him all at once,” takes “hold
of him entirely – body and mind” (6:405; 525), and he bows down at the
crossroads to kiss the earth.
Dmitri’s repeated references to Bernard, as Harriet Murav argues, serve
as a kind of shorthand for Dostoevsky’s rejection of a scientific approach
that would “reduce phenomena to their simplest possible common
denominator and then analyze the relations among them in quantitative
terms” (Murav 49). Still, as Dostoevsky in Crime and Punishment
emphasizes our material existence with his pointed use of the word
“sensation,” he doesn’t reject science altogether so much as, like Collins,
reach for a science other than the Foscovian/Bernard-ian sort, one that
would reflect and inform what Razumikhin calls “the living process of life”
(6:197; 256). In The Brothers Karamazov itself, however, this other kind
of science is most clearly expressed in terms not of physiology, but of
mathematics.
Science Beyond Euclid
Shortly before launching into “The Grand Inquisitor,” Ivan Karamazov
makes surely the most famous reference to non-Euclidean Geometry in all
literature. Ivan begins by assuring Alyosha that he accepts God “pure and
simple.” “But this,” he adds, “needs to be noted”:
if God exists and if he indeed created the earth, then, as we know perfectly
well, he created it in accordance with Euclidean geometry, and he created
human reason with a conception of only three dimensions of space. At the
same time there were and are even now geometers and philosophers [...]
who doubt that the whole universe, or even more broadly, the whole of
being, was created purely in accordance with Euclidean geometry; they
even dare to dream that two parallel lines, which according to Euclid cannot
possibly meet on earth, may perhaps meet somewhere in infinity. I, my
dear, have come to the conclusion that if I cannot understand even that, then
it is not for me to understand about God. I humbly confess that I do not
have any ability to resolve such questions, I have a Euclidean mind, an
earthly mind, and therefore it is not for us to resolve things that are not of
this world (14:214; 235).
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Accordingly, Ivan explains, he simply believes in God, while at the same
time utterly refusing to accept his world, with, as he explains, “one
reservation”:
I have a childlike conviction that the sufferings will be healed and smoothed
over, that the whole offensive comedy of human contradictions will
disappear like a pitiful mirage, a vile concoction of man’s Euclidean mind,
feeble and puny as an atom, and that ultimately, at the world’s finale, in the
moment of eternal harmony, there will occur and be revealed something so
precious that it will suffice for all hearts [...] to justify everything that has
happened with men – let this, let all of this come true and be revealed, but I
do not accept it and do not want to accept it! Let the parallel lines even
meet before my own eyes: I shall look and say, yes, they meet, and still I
will not accept it (6:214-5; 235-6).

Diane Oenning Thompson has effectively put to rest the rather extraordinary claim once circulating among scholars of Russian literature that
Einstein developed the theory of relativity from his reading of Dostoevsky
(Thompson 86-90). We needn’t demonstrate a direct contribution to
twentieth and/or twenty-first century science, however, to note something
in this passage at odds with the dominant Positivist paradigm of Dostoevsky’s day.
Thompson argues that Dostoevsky most likely encountered nonEuclidean geometry in a review that appeared in the journal Knowledge
(Знание) in 1876 written by the physicist and physiologist Hermann von
Helmholtz. I would also note that the second volume of George Henry
Lewes’s Problems of Life and Mind, also published in Russian translation
in Knowledge in 1876, includes an article in the appendix on “Imaginary
Geometry and the Truth of Axioms.” Either source suggests the scientific
principles at stake. While Lewes was at one time a devoted disciple of
Comte himself, by Problems of Life and Mind he had moved to a more
Jennings-like science that would break down what he calls “the assumed
distinction between noumenon and phenomenon” (Lewes 168); Helmholtz
is perhaps best known for his work on sound and his emphasis not just on
the source from which the sound emanates, but also on the receiving
capacity of the human ear.13 Their (qualified) dissemination of a mathematics that cuts off from the world as we know it to imagine other possible
kinds of spaces reflects the same belief that perception and what we might
call the material world mutually inflect one another, and the challenge that
this belief presents to Positivist science is clear in Chernyshevsky’s
13

I am indebted to my student Simone Dozier for her thoughtful reading of Helmholtz.
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response. While labeling Helmholtz “one of the greatest of naturalists,”
Chernyshevsky nonetheless described the article on non-Euclidean
geometry as “childish waggery, not worthy of attention” (Kiiko 123).
Chernyshevsky’s sense that science gives fixed answers is, of course,
widely shared, perhaps especially by non-scientists, among them Bakhtin.
For Bakhtin, science is inherently monologic. While he acknowledges that
scientific activity requires that one deal with another’s discourse: “the
words of predecessors, the judgment of critics, majority opinion and so
forth,” Bakhtin presents the relationship of the scientist to his or her subject
as one-way. Because “[t]he entire methodological apparatus of the
mathematical and natural sciences is directed toward mastery over mute
objects, brute things, that do not reveal themselves in words, that do not
comment on themselves,” Bakhtin writes, “[a]cquiring knowledge here is
not connected with receiving and interpreting words or signs from the
object itself under consideration” (Bakhtin 351). As Collins’s and
Dostoevsky’s sensation would remind us, however, science is not always
conceived in those terms.
If Euclidean geometry depends on our belief, in Douglas Hofstadter’s
words, that words like “point” and “line” are “necessarily univalent,
capable of only one meaning,” non-Euclidean geometry as it developed in
fits and starts from the eighteenth century on started exactly from the
recognition that “the four postulates of absolute geometry simply do not
pin down the meanings of the terms ‘point’ and ‘line’” and “that there is
room for different extensions of the notions” (Hofstadter 222).14 It is also
the case that science after Einstein, while not endowing the material world
with actual “words or signs” of its own, nonetheless reflects an understanding of relativity or point of view on various levels. As Peter Gaffney
writes: “Not only does this mean the end of Newtonian universality (the
claim that physical laws are applicable throughout time and space),
challenging claims and assumptions based on the unity of science, but also
it means the end of a mechanistic worldview in which matter passively fills
out a set of determinate spatio-temporal relations” (Gaffney 17). A committed Deleuzian, Gaffney argues further that “a particular (historically
specific) body of scientific thought has a reciprocal relationship with the
object it determines, each one participating in the actualization of the other
and simultaneously traversing a diversity of social, intellectual, and
material processes …” (Gaffney 3-4). In other words, even in a scientific
14

Hofstadter gives the example of elliptical geometry. If we envision geometrical space
as a sphere, a “point” would consist of a “pair of diametrically opposed points of the
sphere’s surface”; a line is then a “great circle on the sphere” (Hofstadter 93).

20

Melissa Frazier

context, subject and object may mutually inflect one another in what
Hofstadter calls a “strange loop,” and if this post-Positivist scientific irresolution is more than Ivan Karamazov can handle, that is Ivan’s problem.
Dostoevsky himself is on home ground here in scientific as well as religious
terms and even in the two together, as what is most striking in Ivan’s
account is that his “Euclidean mind” apparently limits not just his science
but also his religion. The implication is that the two, in certain nonEuclidean forms, might be compatible, and Ivan encounters the same
problem when his devil refers to indeterminate equations.
Before recounting Ivan’s apparent exchange with the devil, our unreliable narrator finds it “decidedly necessary” to inform us that Ivan “was,
that evening, precisely just on the verge of brain fever” (15:69-70; 634).
For all its symbolic value in literary texts ranging from Wuthering Heights
to Madame Bovary, in the nineteenth century, as Audrey C. Peterson
explains, brain fever was also a legitimate medical condition, which is not
to say that Ivan’s devil is only a symptom of his disease. It is instead that
Dostoevsky doesn’t allow us to decide one way or the other: as the devil
himself says in one of his best lines, “‘The other world and material proofs,
la-di-da!’” (15:71; 636-7). As the devil well knows, however, it is exactly
material proofs that Ivan seeks along with definitive answers, above all to
the all-important question that he poses to his interlocutor here “with fierce
insistence”: “‘Is there a God or not?’” (15:77; 642). Unfortunately for Ivan,
with the strikingly underplayed exception of Ilyushechka’s non-corrupting
body, the faith that Dostoevsky offers in The Brothers Karamazov lacks the
final word that he so desires. Still worse from a Positivist point of view, the
devil denies Ivan what he longingly wants to see as the certainties of
science.
As the devil parrots a certain “young thinker’s” own ideas back to him,
he posits a future time when “Man, his will and his science no longer
limited, conquering nature every hour, will thereby every hour experience
such lofty delight as will replace for him all his former hopes of heavenly
delight” (15:83; 649). While, in the devil’s rendering, the “young thinker”
questions whether that day will actually arrive, and even decides that, at
least in the interim, “everything is permitted,” still he clings to the
possibility of eventual certainty: “‘If it does come, then everything will be
resolved and mankind will finally be settled.’” Unfortunately, a science that
resolves all questions is only that science that would exclude indeterminate
equations as it excludes non-Euclidean geometry. “‘[L]ike you, I myself
suffer from the fantastic,’” the devil tells Ivan, “‘and that is why I love your
earthly realism. Here you have it all outlined, here you have the formula,
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here you have geometry, and with us it’s all indeterminate equations!’”
(15:73; 638). Indeterminate equations are equations with more than one
variable and an infinite set of solutions, for example 2x=y; like nonEuclidean geometry, they open up multiple, indeed, infinite possibilities.
Ivan, like all Dostoevsky’s would-be “extraordinary men,” subscribes
to a much more limited and deterministic notion of science. The aspirations
of nineteenth-century Positivism are summed up, albeit parodically, in the
Underground Man’s frustration that “two times two will be four even without my will” (5:117; 31).We see them, too, in Raskolnikov’s attempt to see
a young girl’s abuse and degradation as inevitable: “‘They say that’s just
how it ought to be. Every year they say, a certain percentage has to go ...
somewhere...’” (6:43; 50). Ivan is also without God, not because he is, as
Thompson describes him, Dostoevsky’s “first hero-scientist,” but because,
like Collins’s many scientist-villains, including not just Count Fosco in The
Woman in White, but also Mrs. Lecount in No Name, widow of the famous
Swiss naturalist and current care-taker of his reptiles, and especially Dr.
Benjulia, the repulsive vivisectionist in Heart and Science (1883), he is
trapped in a science that would exclude “living life.” Dostoevsky himself,
however, would seem to subscribe to a more flexible, Ezra Jennings-ish
kind of science, one that actually lends itself to his belief in God.
E. I. Kiiko makes the case for the mutual implication of Dostoevsky’s
science and his religion in his reading of two notes that Dostoevsky wrote
to himself on August 17, 1880, shortly after completing work on the chapter
“The Devil. Ivan Fyodorovich’s Nightmare.” The second note is especially
striking:
The real (created) world is finite, while the immaterial world is infinite. If
parallel lines were to intersect, the law of this world would end.
But they intersect in infinity, and infinity undoubtedly exists. For if
infinity didn’t exist, neither would finiteness, it would be meaningless. And
if infinity exists, then there is a God and a world other than the real (created)
world, one that is based on other laws (Kiiko 126).

Kiiko summarizes Dostoevsky’s thought: “And so, the existence of God
and of the ‘other world’ results from the recognition of the infinity of space,
for which non-Euclidean laws, laws other, than those for Earth, are true”
(Kiiko 126). In Liza Knapp’s formulation, Dostoevsky “finds in nonEuclidean geometry a geometric embodiment of the yearning for infinity
that he felt in his heart” (Knapp 218). What Katz calls a “sophisticated
accommodation ... to the discoveries of science” is also apparent in an 1876
letter to V. A. Alekseev where Dostoevsky writes:
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By the way: remember the contemporary theories of Darwin and others
concerning the descent of man from monkeys. Without engaging in any
theories, Christ explicitly declares that in man, in addition to an animal
world, there is also a spiritual world. And what of it? What difference does
it make where man is descended from ... , God still breathed the breath of
life into him (Katz 14).

Where Katz argues that this more “tolerant response” is less evident in
Dostoevsky’s fictional works, the juxtaposition with Collins underscores
the kind of science that Dostoevsky consistently practices. This science is
apparent not just in his characters’ references to mathematics and his own
recourse to the tools of sensation, but in the absolutely Deleuzian and
Lewesian representation of the city of St. Petersburg in Crime and Punishment as simultaneously both viscerally, materially real and entirely a
projection or reflection of Raskolnikov’s mind. It is this idea of science that
also opens up the question of the detective novel.
Detective Novels and Knowing
Despite T. S. Eliot’s oft-quoted claim that The Moonstone is “the first and
greatest of English detective novels,” most scholars push Collins to the
margins of the genre (Eliot 136). While the general consensus acknowledges Collins’s contribution in his creation of Sergeant Cuff, Jacques
Barzun and Wendell Hertig Taylor express an equally widely held view
when they insist): “Pace T. S. Eliot, this marvelous book is not ‘the greatest
English detective story.’ It is a good mystery with unforgettable characters
and fine melodrama, but Sgt. Cuff (copied from life) is not conspicuously
a detective, and the clues, though fairly laid out from the beginning, satisfy
only an antiquarian interest in ratiocination...” (Barzun 137-8). The same
criticisms then apply also to Dostoevsky, only more so.
Readers have long recognized that Dostoevsky often poses puzzles for
his reader, puzzles that in Crime and Punishment and The Brothers
Karamazov even involve murder. It is also the case that Porfiry Petrovich
in Crime and Punishment, like Cuff, clearly suggests the hero-detective
starting with Dupin, through Sherlock Holmes and on into the twentiethcentury. If, however, as Michael Holquist argues, a tendency towards
excessive “novelism” turns a detective novel into something else,
Dostoevsky is even more “novelistic” (read also: “high”) than Collins. As
A. I. Reitblat points out, Dostoevsky also operated in an entirely different
cultural context, one with a considerably less well-developed sense of
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personal property and legal culture and entirely lacking in any tradition of
private detection. Most importantly even for Reitblat, however, as for
many scholar-devotees of the detective novel, what Barzun and Taylor call
“ratiocination” is as underdeveloped in Dostoevsky as in Collins.
It is Poe who invents the term when he calls the Dupin stories “tales of
ratiocination,” and the word has usually been taken to express a belief in
order that informs the genre above all in its “classic,” or nineteenth-century
phase. Carl Malmgren writes that what he calls mystery fiction “unfolds
in a rational world grounded in laws of cause and effect” (Malmgren 14).
Holquist makes the point more strongly, arguing that Poe “is the Columbus
who lays open the world of radical rationality,” and his detective “the
essential metaphor for order,” “the instrument of pure logic, able to triumph
because he alone in a world of credulous men holds to the Scholastic
principle of adequatio rei et intellectus, the adequation of mind to things,
the belief that the mind, given enough time, can understand everything”
(Holquist 156-7). Evidently a post-Enlightenment phenomenon, “ratiocination” is equally an investment in science.
The relationship with science is already apparent when Dupin at the
climactic moment in “Murders in the Rue Morgue” turns to Cuvier’s “minute anatomical and generally descriptive account of the large fulvous
Ourang-Outang of the East Indian Islands” (Poe 498). More strikingly, as
a great many scholars post-Foucault note, the detective novel after Poe
emerges alongside a science of criminology that by the end of the century
has developed the early tools of forensic science, including finger-printing,
the lie detector, and Bertillon’s system of anthropometry, in Russia as in
the West.15 As Ronald Thomas puts it regarding The Moonstone, Collins’s
innovation is not Cuff, but Ezra Jennings, as Collins’s is the “first novel of
any kind to demonstrate in a compelling way the emergence of the modern
field of forensic science and its growing importance to the new science of
criminology” (Thomas 67).16
In fact Dostoevsky’s and Collins’s play with the possibilities of
subjectivity suggests a science at odds with the aspirations of nineteenthcentury criminology, and, indeed, with the notable exception of Thomas,
for most scholars of the genre, it is exactly in terms of forensic evidence
15

McReynolds offers many examples of the increasing importance of forensic science
in the Russian context, including, in a case that Dostoevsky famously refers to in The
Idiot, in the 1867 trial of the student Danilov where “a cold-blooded killer was identified
in part by a cut on his left hand” (McReynolds 54).
16
See also Thomas’ Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2004).
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that Collins, like Dostoevsky, falls short. It is not just that Jennings’ science
is of a troublingly mystical sort, but that Collins and even more Dostoevsky
pointedly undermine the combined legal and scientific value of any clues
that their investigators unearth. Where Rachel with her eye-witness testimony in The Moonstone is at least objectively right, for example, Grigory’s
eye-witness account of the open door in The Brothers Karamazov, apparent
proof that Dmitri had been in his father’s room, is simply wrong. “Material”
evidence in The Brothers Karamazov is also entirely lacking, as it is in
Crime and Punishment, despite Porfiry Petrovich’s unsubstantiated claim
to have discovered “a little trace” (6:350; 458). If the science and detection
in Dostoevsky and Collins are too unwieldy or too “soft” to fit easily into
a “world of radical rationality,” however, I would suggest that the problem
is our own attachment to the very idea of “ratiocination.” Not only is
nineteenth-century science a great deal more multifaceted than the standard
use of that term would suggest, but so, too, is nineteenth-century detective
fiction.
While Poe is a canonical figure in the history of the detective novel, the
Dupin stories open themselves to more than one interpretation. Where
Holquist sees a metaphor for order, Albert D. Hutter finds in Dupin a
“relentlessly logical process of ratiocination ... thrown into question by a
deeper irrationality” (Hutter 191). Nancy Harrowitz performs a similar
reading when she refers to Dupin’s allegedly “Bi-Part Soul” to argue that
ratiocination is “an operative which can cut through various levels of
reality, a creative reverie which transcends positivistic reason and assumptions” (Harrowitz 195). For McReynolds, “Murders in the Rue Morgue”
both “celebrate[s] the power of reason” in “fine positivist fashion,” and also
“provide[s] an alternative to relying on rationale” (McReynolds 116). The
problem is not just a perhaps contradictory Poe, however, but a reductive
approach that limits our reading of even that most famous of nineteenthcentury detectives: Sherlock Holmes.
For all the conventional wisdom that associates Holmes with “deductive logic and forensic analysis,” in Thomas Sebeok and Jean UmikerSebeok’s account Holmes, too, relies not on deduction, but on a kind of
inspired guessing that the Sebeoks call after Peirce “abduction.” We might
also consider Holmes’ use of cocaine, not just in terms of Mikhailovskii’s
claim that Dostoevsky’s writing functions as a kind of narcotic, but in
Hutter’s argument that the opium-addicted Ezra Jennings is “the ultimate
detective” in The Moonstone “precisely because he is able to see both the
significance of the most trivial details and to allow his mind to wander past
the boundaries of rational thought” (Hutter 191). I emphasize a persistent
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interest in a science shaped by different (sometimes artificially induced)
mental states in Poe and Conan Doyle as in Dostoevsky and Collins not so
much to make the point that the nineteenth-century detective novel is not
as rigidly invested in order as many of its readers maintain, although I think
that that is the case. More importantly, I would argue that order in
nineteenth-century detective novels as in nineteenth-century science stands
not in simple opposition to chaos, but comes in various stripes, above all
those that Eco describes in his commentary to his own post-Modern
contribution to the genre, The Name of the Rose (1980).
The Name of the Rose in Eco’s estimation offers more than one kind of
labyrinth. The labyrinth that is the monastery library is what he calls a
“mannerist maze”: in a “model of the trial-and-error process,” “[t]here is
only one exit, but you can get it wrong.” This solution is one that Ivan
Karamazov could embrace. The actual world as Eco’s hero-detective
comes to know it, however, is a labyrinth of another sort, one possessed of
what Deleuze and Guattari call a “rhizome structure”: “The rhizome is so
constructed that every path can be connected with every other one. It has
no center, no periphery, no exit, because it is potentially infinite.” Unlike
the monastery library, this greater world “can be structured but is never
structured definitively” (Eco 57-8). This ultimately indeterminate world is
Dostoevsky’s and Collins’s as it is Eco’s. We may prefer it otherwise, and
some readers evidently do. Still, the juxtaposition of Dostoevsky and
Collins reminds us that the detective novel, while certainly about science
and detecting, above all is and always has been less about a particular way
of knowing, than about the very difficulty of knowing at all.
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